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My essay, “Multi-Modal Argumentation” was published in the journal, Philosophy of the 
Social Sciences, in 1994 (Gilbert 1994b). This information appeared again in my book, 
Coalescent Argumentation in 1997 (Gilbert 1997). In the ensuing 20 years, there have been 
many changes in Argumentation Theory, and I would like to take this opportunity to examine 
my now middle-aged theory in light of the developments in our discipline. I will begin by 
reminding you of the essential aspects of my theory, make some general comments, and then 
review the several modes individually. 
The theory of multi-modal argumentation holds that communication in general, and 
argumentation specifically, never occurs in one single mode. By a ‘mode’ I mean, fuzzily, a 
means or way of communicating, a form of expression, or a style of imparting information. 
Modes, then, are systems of messaging using culturally dependent signs, signals and methods 
intended to pass information from one subject to another. I never suggested that messages 
were exclusively in one mode or another, but rather that they were all mixed and could only 
be examined separately for the purposes of argumentative investigation. Moreover, I never 
argued for the correctness of the four modes I chose and allowed that other models might 
select three or five or other numbers of modes. 
The four modes I did identify were the Logical, the Emotional, the Visceral, and the 
Kisceral. The logical mode appears in virtually every argument in one way or another. It is 
the mode that assists us in moving from a message to a conclusion in a reasoned and 
patterned way. Some arguments are more logically derived than others, especially those that 
Perelman has called quasi-logical. Moreover, premises within a logical argument will not, 
ipso facto, be themselves highly logical. The second mode is the emotional mode, and here I 
have written that the key is that the emotions being expressed in or by an argument are more 
important that the words being used for that expression. Thus, we often disregard the words 
someone utters because we are confident that the message is expressed in the emotional 
package in which the words are located. 
The third mode is the visceral and covers all aspects of a message or an argument that 
are physical or environmental. Here the idea of environment is being used widely to include 
political and social aspects of a context such as power relations, physical configurations, and 
such like. Visceral events can themselves be premises in an argument and I have used a 
double square bracket to indicate them. E.g., [[Robert touches Marcia’s hand]]. This is 
important because an action can change the significance of the words in a message, and, 
therefore, is part of the message. The final mode I identified involved the area of 
communication that is intuitive, mystical, religious, or revelatory. I call this mode the 
kisceral deriving from the Japanese word ‘ki’ meaning energy. This is a mode that is often 
disdained by rationalists, though they have difficulties dismissing it due to its widespread use 
(Gilbert 2010). It’s fairly clear, for example, that more of the human population believes in 
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the existence of invisible entities than does not, and even scholars who are otherwise highly 
rationalistic believe in various sorts of deities.  
My reasons for introducing the complication of multi-modalities into Argumentation 
Theory has to do with my respect for its importance. I believe that Argumentation Theory is 
a vital discipline that can be used to understand and hone the tools people draw on to 
communicate with each other, embrace agreement and avoid violence.  In order to do this, it 
seems to me that we need to examine those sorts of arguments that ordinary arguers actually 
use. We cannot simply look at those argument forms we believe arguers ought to use, but 
rather those which they do use. It is this belief that lead me to make so much trouble about 
the forms of argument we study and to insist that we must go to the arguer rather than have to 
arguer come to us. The issue, as I saw it, was that Argumentation Theory was focusing on the 
easy parts, the CRCs that were analyzable and that could be broken into easily digested bits 
and be categorized and sorted without too much dissension. Yet our own lived experience of 
arguing with colleagues, friends and family, demonstrates that arguing is not a linear process 
with clearly defined edges and readily identifiable components. Our lived experience entails, 
if anything, the exact opposite conclusion: real, every day, marketplace argumentation is 
frequently chaotic, rambling, emotional, and rife with explicit and implicit references to, and 
reliance on, the context, social milieu, personalities, and personal history of the argument and 
the arguers. 
This is the point made by Willard in 1989, based on his work going back to the 1970s 
(Willard 1989). He claimed that arguers use all tools at their disposal to persuade a dispute 
partner, and also that all communications taking place in an argument are part of it. In my 
work, I took these ideas to the extreme, and included as parts of an argument the physical 
setting, mannerisms used, and a multitude of other factors not normally included in the 
analysis of an argument. I hope that now the purpose and importance of a multi-modal 
approach becomes clearer: In order to investigate the role that all these aspects and factors 
play in a complex communication it is necessary to examine them using more than the tools 
logic and even informal makes available. We need to analyze them according to their 
purpose, intended and actual, and their results, intended and actual. This demands a very 
wide breadth. That is where the multi-modal approach comes in. A multi-modal analysis 
allows us to examine a situation from a variety of perspectives with each one adding more 
information and insights. 
The tools, multi-modal aside, that currently exist are very valuable and very 
important. The ability to diagram an argument, investigate it for fallacies, apply a Pragma-
Dialectic analysis, are all vital tools for the argumentation analyst. Nonetheless, my sense 
that the richness of communication was being missed by not applying these tools within the 
various modes, by not applying them in a finer way, lead me to believe that a great deal of 
importance was lost to the analyst. By using these tools within the individual modes, and by 
tailoring them to the use and value of the individual modes a great deal more can be captured.  
 
I want to emphasize several points that, while mentioned in my work, should be 
stressed. The first involves the difficulty of separating the modes, and, more importantly, 
placing communications in modes. By this I mean to refer to the process of determining that 
some communication, action, message, or argument, is, say, in the visceral mode rather than 
the emotional mode. The fact is, that while there are paradigms of each mode, separability, 
and its analogue categorizability, are never definite. Consider, for example, a grimace. A 
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grimace can be used to demonstrate disapproval, pain, discomfort, or other emotions. In 
itself, it is a visceral action, a physical movement of the lips and face. In context it might 
indicate something emotional, as when one grimaces at the thought of going to the dentist or 
taking an exam. We cannot know, and need not know, if a grimace is primarily a visceral or 
emotional object, except when we are actually analyzing the role one particular grimace-
token plays in a particular argumentative interaction. 
In this regard, it might have been better to have referred to the modes as “aspects” as 
this might have emphasized the ability of an occurrence to play many roles, and to be viewed 
in different ways. The modes do not indicate really different things, but rather ways of 
analyzing or dissecting things according to certain interesting conceptions. A grimace, as it 
occurs in an encounter, simply is what it is. The phenomenological experience of a grimace 
provides us with cues that can be played out in different ways depending largely on the 
balance of the context. We know from Wittgenstein and Grice, to name but two philosophers, 
that we cannot determine meaning outside of context. The phrase, “That’s just great!” can 
indicate joy or bedevilment, just like, “¡Perfecto, es todo necesitamos ahora!” Interestingly, 
an English speaker might well understand the import of the Spanish declaration simply by 
virtue of the context, grimace, and tone. The modes, rather than being tools for categorizing, 
are tools for understanding the meanings of a communication. 
Whenever we do philosophy, communication theory or any sort of abstract analysis, 
we necessarily take things apart, break them up into bite-size analyzable bits. It is imperative, 
however, that we not mistake the analysis, the model, for the reality.  We need to look at the 
reality as if it were made up of bits and pieces, but we must not forget that it is a heuristic and 
that the reality is itself dense and complete. If, to use an analogy, we mix several colours 
together is a glass bowl, we end up with a new colour. We know what colours we put in, but 
the result is still one colour, and it is not possible to subsequently separate them out. The 
modes are like the colours: we know that they are all in there, and we can discuss their 
impact on the whole, but in doing so we are using constructs and not reality. It is this that I 
would emphasize more and, perhaps, the term ‘aspects’ would add to that emphasis. 
 
I would like to turn now to the various modes and discuss them in light of the further 
work I have done, and some of the comments that have been made. Of course, the pre-
eminent mode, the grandmother, is the logical mode. In fact, some rationalists believe that all 
communication is really logical communication in other guises. That is not to say that every 
communication is straightforwardly logical, but rather that the way in which we make sense 
of it is logical. So, we translate, if you will, in lightning speed so that it just seems that the 
reasoning is non-logical when in reality it is very logical. Fricker (1995 183) responds to this 
sort of approach when he is talking about intuition. Can we really imagine, he asks, that the 
many things we do automatically or quickly like hitting a tennis ball or recognizing a face are 
really long drawn out processes done quickly? That hardly makes sense. Damasio (1994, 
171) calls this the High Reason view and argues that it simply can’t work: the available 
alternatives when we make choices are overwhelmingly vast, and it would take forever to 
sort through them no matter how quickly we did it. 
I do not want to spend a great deal of time here simply arguing that the non-logical 
modes exist. I concede that we can just about always create a story about a non-logical 
communication that provides it a logical gloss, but I do not see what that proves. We can give 
a mechanistic interpretation of, say, love and the sacrifices one makes for it, but such 
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explanations are inevitably unsatisfactory. They fail to explain why some people fall in love 
and others do not. They fail to explain altruism, why Jane might love Jack but not his twin 
brother Alan, and other lovely anomalies. Moreover, there is a difference between the cause 
of something and the experience of it. Knowing that when I burn my hand, I am just exciting 
a bunch of nerves to an extremely high level of activity, does not make the pain any less.  
I was very careful, back when I first introduced the idea of modes, to choose the term 
‘logical’ rather than the term ‘rational.’ This was done to emphasize that there is nothing 
irrational about the non-logical modes, but rather, as I put it then, logic is imperialistic and 
likes to seem in charge of everything, but that’s just highlighting, if you will, it’s aggressive 
underpinnings. So, in my world, saying of a communication that it is not logical is not to 
denigrate it, but, rather, to point out that different tools need to be used. Among the tools I 
have examined most closely are those pertaining to the emotional mode.  
 
There is a good case for saying that (virtually) every argument contains at least a 
minimal emotional component for the simple reason that one is moved from inertia to make 
an argument. The stimulus that moves one from inertia is some degree of emotional reaction, 
some sense of disagreement, some feeling that something is wrong and that one cares 
enough to act. This does not mean that every argument is, at heart, an emotional argument. 
Rather, it means that emotion and whatever logical sense goes into an argument are 
inseparable. Even though the communication might be quite logical, an emotional argument 
may still be present provided the emotions expressed in the argument are more important 
than the words and signals used to express them (Gilbert 1995, 8). In other words, the 
message is in the emotions and not in the discursive component. A simple example is when, 
as above, the grimace contradicts the statement. Someone grimacing and saying they are not 
in pain will not be believed whereas someone smiling and not exhibiting stress will be. 
All this I take to be non-controversial, and I believe that anyone involved in any form 
of communication studies, let alone Argumentation Theory, would not demur from such an 
inane conclusion. I have provided specific maps for investigating emotional arguments in 
both the Informal Logic approach and the Pragma-Dialectic theory, (Gilbert 2004, 2005). In 
these essays I show that the multi-modal approach can be used without doing serious damage 
to the structure or intent of the respective theories. However, these major theories have not 
embraced any alternative way of including the analysis of emotion in argument. I believe this 
demonstrates, more than anything else, that there still exists a strong prejudice within 
Argumentation Theory against emotion as an argument forming apparatus (Vide Godden 
2003).  
There have been, to be clear, a number of scholars who have been examining the 
relationship between emotion and argument. These include, aside from myself, Walton, Ben-
Ze’ev, Plantin, Tindale, Burleson, Palnalp, Wohlrapp and Carozza (Ben-Ze'ev 1995, 
Burleson and Planalp 2000, Plantin 1999, Walton 1992, Wohlrapp 2006, Carozza 2007). 
Nonetheless, emotion is still an aside, as opposed to a factor that must be considered in all 
circumstances. One reason for this is the mistaken belief that discursive communication is 
considerably more precise and manageable than emotional communication. I have argued 
against this (Gilbert 2002a) but the prejudice is deeply rooted even though the truth is that we 
trust emotional communications more than their linguistic components. Everyone who is 
married knows that when the spouse says, “Do whatever you want; I don’t care,” it is the 
emotion and not the words that contain the real message. 
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There is a reason for the avoidance of emotional messages that goes to the heart of the 
issue: the fear of psychologism. As I use the term here, I refer to the ascription to a subject of 
a position, belief or attitude based on non-discursive information communicated by the 
emotion present in a message. Such an ascription is a direct violation of the Pragma-Dialectic 
Rule III: “An attack on a standpoint must relate to the standpoint that has really been 
advanced by the protagonist” (Eemeren and Grootendorst 1987 286). So, assuming that an 
interlocutor has expressed an emotional statement which she has not explicitly uttered, it may 
violate this rule. On the other hand, the very next rule, IV, states: “A person can be held to 
the premisses he leaves implicit” (op cit 287). It is possible that one could play with this 
tension provided one can determine safe rules for identifying those situations when an 
emotional message can be considered implicit. To see an attempt at such an analysis see 
(Gilbert 2002b).  
Informal Logic similarly has a prejudice against the unexpressed except insofar as it 
might be seen to apply to virtually deductively entailed enthymematic consequences. Here 
the penalty is most likely a charge of Hasty Conclusion or possibly Ignoratio Elenchi. In any 
case, Informal Logic has a decided antipathy toward including emotional message 
components as integrated parts of argument. This is not to say that emotional components are 
ruled out of court, but rather that they must be expressed quite explicitly in ways that 
emotions are rarely presented. This is clearly demonstrated when arguments are diagrammed: 
there is simply no place to put the emotional interpretation of a message that may, in fact, 
straightforwardly contradict its discursive statement. In fact, the ideal Informal Logic for 
communication is one that Barbara O’Keefe (B. 1988) describes as utilizing the Expressive 
Method Design Logic, the least flexible and most unsophisticated of the three she describes.  
 
The visceral mode covers a wide range of communicative factors that, like emotion, 
are often considered peripheral or irrelevant. Certainly, the visceral mode includes what is 
generally considered non-verbal communication, but also further areas that go beyond that 
category. To begin with, I would place some non-verbal communications in the emotional 
category rather than the visceral because their emotional content simply outweighs their 
physicality. That is, the fact of the action or message’s being attached or connected to the 
body or context is not as important as the emotional content it carries. This is analogous to 
discursive versus emotional content: where when the latter outweighs the former, the 
message is considered emotional. Secondly, there are visceral aspects of a communication 
which I believe to be very important that would only be considered non-verbal 
communication at a stretch. These include power relations, argument style, social and 
cultural considerations such as class and gender, as well as other factors that influence an 
argument or can be used in an argument that would not traditionally be considered non-
verbal communication. 
The standard approaches place a huge emphasis on the discursive, often to the point 
where if something is not discursive it is, for all practical purposes, ruled out of court. How, I 
wonder, can one remove the physical setting of an argument from the process of the 
argument? How can we ignore the role, for example, of uniforms? Of a judge’s robes? Or 
even the male professor’s ubiquitous tweed jacket? Oh, the traditionalist answers, but it is a 
fallacy to take those things into account when evaluating an argument. But it is impossible 
not to take them into account when having an argument (Gilbert 2002a). To mention but one 
area in which such visceral considerations play an important role, consider gender in 
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argument. Edeslky and Tannen (1993), for example, show that men take more speaking turns 
than women in mixed gender meetings, and go so far as to suggest that the traditional yacky 
female is likely  one who talks as much as a man. Gender makes an enormous difference in 
the process of an argument no matter how much we think it ought not (Gilbert 1994a), and I 
cannot shake the feeling that it is important that we pay attention to what is before we focus 
only on what ought be. 
Authority and categorization, whether by race, gender, culture, or any other means 
play an overweening role in the process of argumentation and we ignore it at our peril. The 
dearth of women in philosophy, for example, is laid by some (Rooney 2010) at the feet of the 
style of argumentation used in philosophy, and especially its reliance on the argument-as-war 
metaphor. What does it mean, then, to state that such factors are irrelevant to the analysis of 
an argument? It means that we are removing the argument from its context, examining it en 
abstracto, as a CRC, a claim-reason-complex, something that exists independent of its users, 
its hearers, its senders, or persons, and, I believe, there is no such thing. Having said that, let 
me give an appreciation to every model that is a tool in the Argumentation Theorist’s 
toolbox. There is nothing wrong with taking a piece of an argument and using it to 
demonstrate the kind of connectivity that occurs in argumentation, or to show that different 
parts of an argument support each other in identifiable ways. Whether the process is one 
involving formal logic, informal logic, an argument map, or a Pragma-Dialectic speech act 
analysis, it is very valuable – so long as the analysis is not confused with the argument. 
What I am doing by including the visceral mode as a form that must be investigated is 
making room for all the factors mentioned above as well as many others to be examined. 
Once we understand a mode, how it works, what its dynamics are, how it can be used both 
properly and improperly, then we might be able to create some valuable normative correlates 
that will be useful. And this is why Argumentation Theory must be a discipline in its own 
right, rather than an area cobbled together from bits and pieces of other, more established 
areas. A ship builder will employ carpenters, electrician’s, all sorts of engineers, glaziers, and 
so on, but it is the art of creating a ship that must hold it all together so that the finished 
project is functional, beautiful, practical and buildable. 
 
Recently I have been thinking about the role of kisceral arguments (Gilbert 2010). 
The kisceral mode includes argument forms and data that are involved with intuition, the 
mystical, hunches, the religious, mysterious, and generally, non-sensory knowledge and 
forms of persuasion. As I regularly point out, more of the human population believes in the 
existence of invisible being such as gods, ghosts, spirits and so on than does not. Moreover, 
many of these people believe they have communion with such entities and/or insight into 
their nature and being. As puzzling as I find this, it is nonetheless the case, and even many 
highly educated persons maintain such beliefs. One need only look at the scholarly journals 
that abound in theology and religious studies to see the truth of this. The difficulty with the 
kisceral mode is twofold. The first issue reflects the strong sense of certainty, of surety, that 
many people have concerning some non-sensory belief, while the second centres on the 
inability of such beliefs to be subject to falsification. These two problems are closely related 
and intertwined. 
Surety is at the core of intuition insofar as it puts these beliefs and arguments apart 
from other, more empirical beliefs. In fact, we often feel more strongly and believe more 
fervently in a select number of our non-sensory beliefs than we do in our collection of facts. I 
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believe with a great deal of certainty, for example, that if one were to write out an integer 
with as many places as hairs on the head of this audience, there would still be one higher. I 
can’t prove this, yet I believe it with certainty. This is truly bizarre: here I am a highly 
rational person holding firmly to an unfalsifiable belief that claims that there exists an 
infinity of invisible objects. It gets worse. Not only do I hold such beliefs, but I also hold that 
many others who hold different falsifiable beliefs with just as much evidence as I have, and 
believe them just as fervently as I believe my beliefs, are wrong.  
My friend Kathy believes that everything that happens to you happens because you 
want it to happen. You may not know that you want it to happen, but you must because 
otherwise it wouldn’t happen. This includes everything from winning the lottery to having 
cancer. The analyticity and circularity of her position does not faze her in the least, any more 
than the definitional quality of there being no highest integer perturbs me. Yet it strikes me 
that she is wrong and is not justified in holding her belief while I do have such justification. 
Here we might say: my belief is fact, yours is theory, and hers is mysticism. In other words, I 
know what I am talking about, but she doesn’t. Nonetheless, both beliefs are unfalsifiable, 
and both are held with a great deal of certainty, perhaps hers more than mine, but mine is 
pretty solid as well. 
When philosophers talk about kisceral arguments they typically worry about such 
things as axioms and foundational normative principles (DePaul and Ramsey 1997). One 
ultimate difficulty for those who would like to dismiss intuitional arguments, is that the 
grounds for doing so typically rely on intuition (Sosa 2006). One way of thinking about 
kisceral arguments is to consider the Discovery/Justification distinction. We tell our 
introductory students that the process of discovery is different than the presentation of 
justification. Yet in many kisceral arguments this is not the case; in those cases, the 
experience of discovery is the same as the justification. The mystic whose acolyte proceeds 
along certain specified steps may be following the only form of justification available, just as 
the Intuitionist mathematicians saw the process of proof creation, the actual construction of a 
mathematical object, as essential to its justification. Are there facts we cannot comprehend if 
we do not have certain experiences? Can a male never understand a mother’s love because he 
has never experienced pregnancy? Am I an atheist because I have never had a revelation or a 
mystical experience? In most cases I reject these ideas for what I consider are good reasons. I 
believe, for example, that there is likely no major difference between the love of an adoptive 
mother compared to a biological one, and once exceptions begin to accrue, it’s only a matter 
of time before they become overwhelming. 
The problem is that my belief, even if supported by evidence from social psychology, 
ultimately rests on an intuition as well. This means that the role of Argumentation Theory is 
to find the means for separating and evaluating different beliefs according to criteria that can 
be accepted by the partners, and agreed upon as legitimate grounds for distinguishing 
between acceptable and unacceptable beliefs. This, of course, has both object level and meta 
level applications. The object level may have identifiable rules and procedures as Western 
philosophy does with logic and its less formal siblings, or if not carefully laid out there are 
likely precedents and traditions. On the meta level matters are more complex because it is 
there that we will find differences in basic means of establishing beliefs and truths. A Papal 
edict, for example, does not carry weight with a non-Catholic, while for a member of the 
faith it is a sign of absolute truth. In these cases, kisceral arguments carry great weight, and 
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the question of whether or not we can separate those we like and those we do not becomes 
much more tenuous. Still, the job is there to be done. 
 
It will have been noticed in my presentation that I have not distinguished between 
arguments as objects and arguments as processes, or, to use D. O’Keefe’s (1977) language, 
argument1 and argument2. I have avoided this distinction because, on the one hand, the multi-
modal framework cuts across them, and on the other, the distinction itself is not terribly 
useful aside from providing some paradigmatic exemplars. The real problem with the 
argument1 and argument2 distinction lies in the complexity and necessity of context in 
understanding arguments. The identification and isolation of a typical argument1 requires that 
we understand enough of the context to be able to remove it and inspect it, and yet, unless we 
are examining something created for a Critical Thinking class, it is impossible to understand 
it in isolation from that context. Moreover, if we allow that anything that influences an 
argument is part of it, then the context is part of it and, thereby, an argument2. We end up 
with a sort of Heisenberg Principle of Argumentation: to remove a part of an argument from 
its context is to thereby, ipso facto, change it. This is not to say that we cannot study 
something in isolation, but rather that when we do so we are missing a great deal of 
important information.  
I believe it is obvious that the notion of context is important, and many authors and 
theories pay lip service to this. Examples are often preceded by short paragraphs that 
describe the general background, for example, of a letter to the editor. But this is nothing. 
Compare this to the analysis that might accompany the discovery of an anthropological relic 
where the surrounding area, adjacent soil, general location, historical knowledge of the area, 
flora and fauna will all be examined to learn more about the object. Context can demonstrate 
a great deal as when we examine a political situation and the arguments presented for it. 
Duran’s 2006 analysis of the Chilean press (Duran 2006), takes enormous amounts of local, 
social and historical information into account. Moreover, a rich account naturally examines 
the several modes as a means to understanding an object and its processes. If our 
archeological find was a tool, was it decorated? Did it appear cared for? Important to its 
owner? Part of a set? These are emotional questions. Was it made from local materials? What 
tools were used to make this one? These are visceral question. Did it have a spiritual aspect? 
Were there designs appealing to gods or demons? These are kisceral aspects. Just as with 
other endeavours, understanding arguments requires a knowledge of the context, and the 
ways in which the message was communicated, intended and used. This, in turn, can be ably 
assisted by a multi-modal analysis. 
One very interesting factor that has come to the fore in the 20 or so years since I 
began promulgating multi-modal argumentation has been just where and where not it has, if 
you will, caught on. It has not been a major success in Argumentation Theory as performed 
in Canada, the United States, or Holland; three places where Argumentation Theory has 
definitely taken hold. These are all countries where the logical mode and the critical-logical 
model are dominant. While certainly eschewing formal logic as a model for marketplace 
argumentation, its replacement, informal logic or pragma-dialectics, is also quite structured 
and linear. Most importantly, it is product-orientated. Arguments are artifacts that are viewed 
and examined in isolation from context and situation. The arguer is irrelevant to the analysis 
of the dispute on pain of fallacy, i.e., argumentum ad hominem. The self-same argument 
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given in dramatically different circumstances by very different interlocutors and audiences 
with very different goals and backgrounds would be assessed in the very same way.  
It is similar to the role of propositions in philosophy of language. The sentence, ‘The 
cat is on the mat,’ we are told is the same proposition as the sentence, “That damn cat is on 
my grandmother’s hand-made mat again!” I find this ludicrous. If you find it true, then so 
much the worse for the idea of proposition, a concept I have not understood in 50 years of 
philosophy. We do not communicate via propositions, but with messages, and messages 
contain a wealth of information not carried in words. Arguments are much the same: an 
argument is a series of messages centred on an avowed disagreement. Everything that 
touches on the comprehension and interpretation of those messages is part of the argument. 
This includes the relevant emotions, physical location, personalities of the arguer and 
audience, gender of the arguer and audience, actions of the participants, and even possibly 
the weather. To say that Informal Logic and pragma-dialectics do not make room for such 
factors is an understatement. 
Multi-modal argumentation as well as Coalescent Argumentation have been well 
received in other places. One, in particular, is Mexico. At a conference at Universidad 
Autónoma de Nuevo Leon, I learned that a number of graduate students were writing 
dissertations focused on my work. This was also true at the Universidad Autónoma de 
Nayarit and the Universidad de Guadalajara. In addition, a number of younger scholars in 
Europe, including Spain, are also finding the work appealing. My recent book, Arguing with 
People, has been translated in Spanish by Fernando Leal of the Universidad de Guadalajara, 
and is now available (Gilbert 2017). This is being sold at a nominal cost (MP$200) to make it 
maximally available. In addition, I have spoken at many universities in Mexico, and expect 
to visit more. I put forward a totally un-evidenced theory that there is a factor of cultural 
attractiveness involved. Clearly, my work appeals to the Latin soul, a soul that typically 
embraces emotion and, yes, the mystical. This openness means that not everything is 
assumed to be straightforward, orderly and following a set pattern. My approach to argument 
views it as a social interaction where anything can and does happen. Understanding an 
argument does not, to me, mean identifying its premisses and conclusions; it goes beyond the 
logical, formal or informal, relations between the parts of “the argument.” The indeterminacy 
of translation itself precludes the identification of such allegedly precise components, as 
anyone who has argued with students following a translation quiz can attest.  
To understand an argument we must, as Willard said, “get our hands dirty.”  We have 
to know the actors, what they are feeling, what their goals are, their motivations, values, 
relationships and shared beliefs. Of course, applying Informal Logic precepts can be 
valuable, but not as a way of understanding what the argument is about or whether it is a 
good or bad one. For that, much more information is needed. So, cultures which are not 
restrictive in their means of expression and give license to emotional, physical, and kisceral 
arguments as well as the logical, are cultures in which my work can thrive.  
 
I have, in the preceding, tried to present both an amplification and defence of multi-
modal argumentation. I believe, as do some others, that it can be a useful and powerful tool 
for investigating the structure, meaning, and reliability of arguments. We must never forget, 
in examining the models that make theorizing possible, that the models are but mere shadows 
of the reality. 
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